A critical flaw in argumentation ethics, universally preferable behavior and the estoppel approach 2022-06-28 Tuukka Pensala There are many possible ways to generalize a particularistic rule or norm. When making a generalization one chooses which one of the conceivable generalizations to use. Generalization is thus a form of interpretation, or even a question of taste, instead of deduction. As such, generalization is not a valid means of deduction. Keeping this in mind, let's review three arguments for libertarian ethics. ARGUMENTATION ETHICS The logic of argumentation ethics proposed by Hans-Hermann Hoppe proceeds like this: 1) In the action of arguing one already presupposes libertarian property norms. 2) Thus arguing for any contradicting ethic (any variation of socialism) is a performative contradiction. 3) As the justification of any normative claim is decided in the course of argumentation, then only the libertarian ethic is justifiable. Let's take a closer look at step one. "They [propositions] require a proposition maker who in order to produce any validity claiming proposition whatsoever must have exclusive control (property) over some scarce means defined in objective terms and appropriated (brought under control) at definite points in time through homesteading action. Thus any proposition that would dispute the validity of the homesteading principle of property acquisition or that would assert the validity of a different incompatible principle would be falsified by the act of proposition making [...]." [1] It is true that a proposition maker must have previously appropriated some scarce resources through some particular appropriating action and that he must have (at least at the time) presupposed himself to be justified to take on those appropriating actions. But this does not mean that the proposition maker would have to also presuppose the validity of the presented generalization chosen here by Hoppe, namely the homesteading principle. The proposition maker can without problems, for example, presuppose only justification for those particular appropriating actions that he actually took, or the validity of some other, more, less or differently generalized norm than the homesteading principle, that permits his particular appropriating actions. For example, the proponent could, consistent with his prior appropriations, argue that "appropriation by me is always just", or that "the people with high enough IQ have the superior claim", or that "the poor have the superior claim", or he could even generalize further than the libertarian homesteading principle to "the first appropriator of an object is the rightful owner whether the object is physical or not", which would allow people to own thoughts, feelings and ideas in addition physical objects. The leap of generalization from "the specific appropriations of the proponent" to "the homesteading principle" leaves a logical gap in the deductive chain of argumentation ethics. This reinforces the understanding that even though one has to presuppose a subset of libertarian property norms in order to argue, it is simply not necessary to presuppose the whole set of libertarian property norms when arguing. Therefore the step one is invalid. This conclusively prevents argumentation ethics from reaching its goal. UNIVERSALLY PREFERABLE BEHAVIOR Universally preferable behavior (UPB) proposed by Stefan Molyneux posits that only such behavior that can be universally preferred should be accepted as a moral rule. With this requirement of universality one can discard physical conflicts as non-moral, because the victim of aggression never prefers the aggression -- otherwise it would not be aggression and he would not be a victim. However, with universality Molyneux also means generality, as the following shows: "The moral proposition "eating fish is evil" thus fails the test of universality because it is too specific to be generalized -- it is like saying "my theory of gravity applies only to pink rocks." If it is a theory of gravity, then it must apply to everything; if it only applies to pink rocks, then it is not a theory of gravity. " [2] Because no objective tuning for generalization exists, Molyneux tunes, and must tune, the generality test of UPB to a personally satisfying level. Because of this, the results of UPB rely crucially on subjective preference instead of deduction. This conclusively prevents UPB from reaching its goal. THE ESTOPPEL APPROACH The estoppel approach of individual rights presented by Stephan Kinsella uses the estoppel principle as a limitation on what normative claims can be presented in an argument, particularly when one objects to punishments for his own actions. In short, one is logically prevented, estopped, from presenting a claim contradicting one's other implicit or explicit claims when arguing, as claiming a contradiction would necessarily contradict the purpose of argumentation, that is, prevent finding the truth. However, the estoppel approach also relies on a requirement for generality of normative claims: "When applying estoppel, then, the arguer's claims to be examined must be in a universalizable form. He cannot escape the application of estoppel by arbitrarily specializing his otherwise-inconsistent views with liberally-sprinkled "for me only's." Since he is engaged in arguing about norms, the norms asserted must be universalizable." [3] When applying the above-mentioned condition for generality, one inevitably chooses one flavor of generalization over other competing flavors, which means that the normative results of the estoppel approach are tainted by an arbitrary choice, much like the results of the previous two arguments. Thus also the estoppel approach fails to reach its goal. REMARKS It should be noted that the claim "a normative rule should be universally acceptable" is radically different from the claim "the form of a normative rule should be general enough", although both requirements are often lumped under the singular condition of "universality". A normative claim can contain particularistic features and still be applicable to the whole of humanity. The first requirement is valid and the second one is invalid. That said, this doesn't mean that a valid libertarian ethical theory can't imply general rules of some sort. The particular flavor of generality just has to arise from the deduction as a result instead of being presupposed by a libertarian-minded proponent. Avoiding arguments from generality in libertarian ethical theories will make them better and also more persuasive for those who have opposing tastes for generalizations compared to what libertarians tend to have. [1]: Hoppe, Hans-Hermann, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, 2nd edition, p. 405 [2]: Molyneux, Stefan, Universally Preferable Behavior - A Rational Proof of Secular Ethics, Version 1.0, p. 90. [3]: Kinsella, Stephan, ESTOPPEL: A NEW JUSTIFICATION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, p. 67